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NEPA IN THE DOMAIN OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
POLICY: SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE 
NEGOTIATION OF MEANING 
James P. Boggs* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past two decades, Congress and a number of state legisla-
tures have enacted statutes requiring government agencies to eval-
uate the environmental impacts of any proposed agency actions. To 
comply with these statutes, such as the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969,1 agencies typically must prepare detailed 
studies known as "environmental impact statements," or "EISs."2 
The purpose of an EIS is to apprise the public of a proposed agency 
action and, at least in principle, provide the agency with the infor-
mation it needs to make an informed decision about that action. 3 
Through their EIS requirements, laws such as NEPA mandate both 
the creation of knowledge-including knowledge about society, or 
"social knowledge"-and the use of that knowledge in public deci-
sionmaking. 4 As a result, these laws raise subtle and difficult prob-
lems of policy implementation . 
• Adjunct Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Montana; Associate, Public 
Policy Research Institute, University of Montana. B.A., 1963, University of Oklahoma; Ph.D. 
Anthropology, 1974, University of Oregon. The author would like to thank Margery Brown 
of the University of Montana Law School for her valuable suggestions and thoughtful encour-
agement in the pursuit of this inquiry. 
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988). Section 4331 identifies the concerns that federal agencies 
are to address in evaluating proposed "major federal actions," as well as the spirit in which 
they are to implement the procedures described in section 4332. Id. §§ 4331, 4332(C). The 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) promulgated regulations under NEPA in 1978. 40 
C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508 (1990). 
2 See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 1:01, at 1 (1984). 
3 See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
4 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988); id. § 4332(A) (federal agencies shall "utilize a systematic, 
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social 
31 
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Sociocultural and environmental concerns intertwine in the large, 
capital-intensive projects that trigger the EIS process. The com-
munities that such projects may affect often are worried about a 
particular project's anticipated sociocultural impacts, and it is these 
impacts that frequently become the focus for intense public debate. 
By law, an EIS must catalogue and evaluate the sociocultural as well 
as the environmental consequences of a proposed project. 5 Legisla-
tors and agency officials, however, frequently misunderstand and 
even overlook the social impact review requirements of environmen-
tal review law, with troubling and often expensive consequences. In 
addition, scholars by and large have disregarded the intriguing prob-
lems of legally mandated social knowledge use.6 As a result of this 
two-tiered neglect, the social and cultural dimensions of the EIS 
process are its least understood and least developed aspects. 
Focusing on NEP A as the model environmental review statute, 
this Article explores the role of social science in the EIS process and 
in agency decisionmaking. It aims to draw attention to the impor-
tance of measuring social impacts during the EIS process, and to 
suggest a more complete conceptual framework for inquiring into 
the issues that social knowledge use raises. In particular, this Article 
examines the preparation of social impact assessment (SIA) studies 
that involve Native American tribes. SIA studies are a mandated 
part of all EISs.7 Their inclusion in EISs means that decisions about 
natural resource use, which agencies previously would have based 
solely on engineering, economic, and environmental grounds, also 
must address social concerns. 
When an environmental review statute such as NEP A requires a 
government agency to assess a proposed project's social impacts, it 
introduces not simply a new topic for consideration, but a whole new 
body of knowledge, into the agency's decisionmaking process. This 
sciences ... in planning and decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environ-
ment") (emphasis added); id. § 4332(B) (federal agencies shall "identify and develop methods 
and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities 
and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking"); id. § 4332(C) (federal 
agencies shall evaluate all "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment") (emphasis added). 
5 See id. § 4332(A)-(C). 
6 The field of "social knowledge utilization" has not yet formulated a comprehensive ap-
proach to environmental review laws and their requirements for the wide-scale use of social 
knowledge. See generally William Dunn & B. Holzner, Knowledge in Society: Anatomy of an 
Emergent Field, in 1 KNOWLEDGE IN SOC'y 3 (1988) (overview of literature in field of social 
knowledge utilization). 
7 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.6, 1508.8(b) (1990); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A)-(C) (1988). 
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Article addresses the fundamental question of what happens when 
a statute compels the introduction of new types of knowledge into 
an established decisionmaking arena. In pursuing this inquiry, the 
Article views agency decisions as occurring within "policy domains."8 
A policy domain comprises the subject area in which a government 
agency makes its policy decisions. For example, the domain of forest 
management deals with forests, and the domain of federal Indian 
policy addresses issues affecting Native Americans. The types of 
knowledge that an agency uses to make its policy decisions demar-
cate the boundaries of its policy domain. Agencies typically do not 
use all the available knowledge regarding a subject area to make 
decisions in that area. They not only consider some issues irrelevant, 
but also simply do not use certain knowledge about issues that they 
do consider relevant. In other words, agencies maintain boundaries 
of their particular policy domains by selectively admitting knowledge 
into the public arena as the basis for their decisions. 
Because the use of "social knowledge" in decisionmaking shapes 
governmental priorities, participants in public disputes about the 
types of knowledge that will inform policy decisions in effect are 
negotiating the very contours of social reality. 9 In this light, the EIS 
may be understood as a means by which communities, environmental 
groups, and Native American tribes may introduce a wider variety 
of "forms of social knowledge"lO into public policy deliberations. In 
other words, it is a tool for challenging long-entrenched policy do-
main boundaries. 
The problems that commentators on environmental review law 
have noted in the implementation of NEPA's social impact review 
requirementsll are more understandable when one acknowledges the 
existence of policy domains. Indeed, the neglect of the social dimen-
sion in both the practice and the theory of environmental review 
exemplifies the mechanism of policy domain boundary maintenance 
at work. Certainly, many of the areas of agency decisionmaking that 
laws like NEP A affect, such as forest management and water re-
8 See infra notes 80-113 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 77, 109 and accompanying text. 
10 This Article uses the term "forms of social knowledge" to convey the understanding, 
popularized by Thomas Kuhn and now accepted by many philosophers of science, that knowl-
edge occurs not as discrete facts, but as organizing principles, or "paradigms," by which facts 
are understood. See THOMAS s. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 7, 
110-74 (1962). A central tenet of this Article is that knowledge constitutes not mere under-
standing, but a constantly evolving set of rules for action. 
11 See infra notes 31-53 and accompanying text. 
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source policy, traditionally have not been understood to require 
social research or encompass social concerns. 
Thus, comprehending the dynamics of maintaining policy domain 
boundaries is central to the successful implementation of environ-
mental review statutes. To illustrate this point, this Article examines 
the federal "Indian" policy domain12 and evaluates the success of the 
EIS process in introducing new "knowledge forms" into government 
decisionmaking regarding Native Americans. 13 Interestingly, much 
social science knowledge proves to be as foreign to Indian policy as 
to national forest policy. The United States Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA), for example, continues to resist NEPA and make little use 
of social science. 14 
This Article first considers the role that the social impact review 
requirements of NEPA play in agency decisionmaking and judicial 
review. It discusses the failure of scholars in various academic dis-
ciplines to consider the problem of implementing the social impact 
review requirements of environmental review laws. This Article 
then critiques existing commentaries on the practice of SIA and 
proposes a new framework for understanding the value of SIA. This 
framework builds on interpretive approaches from the fields of an-
thropology, social knowledge utilization, and law and society studies. 
Finally, this Article examines two recent cases to show how NE-
PA's mandate for social impact review can change the premises upon 
which agencies base their decisions in the domain of federal Indian 
policy. It concludes that the particular problems of implementing 
social impact review requirements implicate broad questions regard-
ing power and the use of knowledge in a democracy. For this reason, 
the preparation of more adequate SIA studies, and thus the intro-
duction of new and different types of social knowledge into govern-
ment decisionmaking, is desirable. 
Inquiry into the role of applied social science in statutorily man-
dated environmental review is timely. On one hand, there are events, 
such as Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and issues, such 
as nuclear waste disposal and global warming, that become ever 
more large-scale and complex and have innumerable technical and 
12 See infra notes 114-48 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 149-206 and accompanying text. 
14 See Dean B. Suagee, American Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources 
Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 50 n.245 
(1982). According to Suagee, "[t]he BIA [has] resisted the application of NEPA .... [It] has 
never seen the need for its environmental review staff to include personnel with expertise in 
cultural anthropology." I d.; see also infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. 
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human ramifications. Even seemingly routine management deci-
sions, such as those involved in maintaining a power plant or piloting 
an oil tanker, can have world-wide consequences. On the other hand, 
just when Western bureaucratic and technical hegemony seems most 
pervasive, the underlying social and cultural diversity of the world's 
peoples has never been more apparent. In light of these emerging 
realities, a public decisionmaking process that integrates current 
scientific and technical knowledge with the myriad perspectives of 
the world's different publics, and then introduces both directly into 
relevant policy debates, merits careful scrutiny. 
II. SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW LAW 
PROCESS: IMPLEMENTING NEPA's MANDATE TO USE SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
A. NEPA: The Model Environmental Review Statute 
Inaugurated in the United States through the enactment of 
NEPA,15 the environmental review law16 process has been adopted 
by a majority of state governments, incorporated into regulations 
by other statutes, and legislated into existence by nations through-
out the world. 17 The key provisions of this "fundamentally new liti-
gative order"18 typically include a scoping procedure by which a 
government agency that is contemplating an action with potentially 
significant environmental and social impacts identifies the proposed 
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988). 
16 Most studies of the NEP A process have considered only the statute itself. NEP A, 
however, has spawned much legislation of the genre first identified in the CEQ's NEPA 
regulations as "environmental review law." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25(a) (1990); see Suagee, supra 
note 14, at 49 n.242, 51 n.250. This Article uses the terms "NEPA" and "environmental review 
law" more or less interchangeably. Although NEPA requires review of a proposed project's 
environmental and social impacts only after the project's scope has been defined, a growing 
number of environmental review laws introduces such review much earlier. See Suagee, supra 
note 14, at 49--50. 
17 See Joan R. Goldfarb, Comment, Extraterritorial Compliance with NEPA Amid the 
Current Wave of Environmental Alarm, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 543, 583-87 (1991); 
see generally Nicholas Robinson, SEQRA's Siblings: Precedents from Little NEPA's in the 
Sister States, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1155 (1982); Philip Weinberg, A Powerful Mandate: NEPA 
and State Environmental Review Acts in the Courts, 5 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
18 Harry N. Scheiber, The Impact of Technology on American Legal Development, 1790-
1985, in TECHNOLOGY, THE ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 83, 107 
(Joel Colton and Stuart Burchey eds., 1987). 
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action's anticipated effects;19 agency preparation of an EIS on these 
possible effects; public distribution of the EIS; and incorporation of 
the EIS and public comments on it into the record that is the basis 
for the agency's final decision. 20 
NEP A mandates that federal agencies take an interdisciplinary 
approach, using both "the natural and social sciences," in preparing 
EISs.21 SIA has evolved within social science as a new discipline to 
meet the challenges of the EIS process.22 Every EIS must contain 
chapters on both the existing social, cultural, and economic condi-
tions in the communities potentially affected by the project under 
review, and the changes that the project may cause. 
NEPA's introduction of social science into public decisionmaking 
has substantial practical implications. The statute's social impact 
review mandate tests government's ability to broaden the range of 
information and perspectives allowed into public policy debates and 
to enhance the roles of rationality and democratic principles in public 
decisionmaking. 23 Current environmental problems are as much so-
cial issues as they are issues of biology or physics. Because the 
solutions to these problems lie as much with social science as with 
natural science, reviewing the social impacts of policy decisions only 
can advance explorations for such solutions. Nonetheless, agency 
officials and scholars alike have paid little attention to the social 
impact review requirements of environmental review law. 
19 The CEQ introduced the concept of scoping in its 1978 regulations in order to ensure 
early and open public involvement. The regulations specifically require federal agencies to 
"[ilnvite the participation of ... any affected Indian tribe .... " 40 C.F.R. § 1501. 7(a)(1) 
(1990); see generally CEQ Scoping Guidance, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,461 (1981). 
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(c)(iHv), 4332(b) (1988). One commentator found "[tlhe provisions of 
NEPA [to bel analogous to a charitable trust established to preserve the integrity of the 
American environment for the 'succeeding generations' of American citizens." Maria Holland, 
Comment, Judicial Review of Compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act: An 
Opportunity for the Rule of Reason, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 743, 746 (1985). For other 
perspectives on NEPA and environmental impact assessment, see Lynton K. Caldwell, A 
Constitutional Law for the Environment, 31 ENV'T 6, 6-11, 25-28 (1989); see generally JOHN 
HAGERTY & D. JOSEPH HEER, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS (1977); 
Sally K. Fairfax, A Disaster in the Environmental Movement, 199 SCI. 743 (1978); Kenneth 
Murchison, Does NEPA Matter?-An Analysis of the Historical Development and Contem-
porary Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 557 
(1984); Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth about NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1988). 
22 James P. Boggs, The Use of Anthropological Knowledge Under NEPA, 49 HUM. OR-
GANIZATION 217, 218 (1990); see generally GREGORY A. DANEKE ET AL., PUBLIC INVOLVE-
MENT AND SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (1983); William R. Freudenburg, Social Impact 
Assessment, 12 ANN. REV. Soc. 451 (1986). 
23 James P. Boggs, EIA Within Democratic Politics, 9 IMPACT ASSESSMENT BULL. (forth-
coming 1991). 
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B. Problems of Implementation 
Scholars in the field of policy implementation24 recognize NEPA's 
significance but largely overlook the statute's social impact review 
requirements, focusing instead on its requirements regarding the 
natural environment. 25 Similarly, scholars in the area of social knowl-
edge utilization have neither considered the question of social knowl-
edge use under NEPA nor recognized that this question constitutes 
a relevant and intriguing area of inquiry.26 Moreover, although 
NEPA has generated a large and often thoughtful legal scholarship, 
that portion of the scholarship focusing on NEP A's social impact 
review requirements is sparse and narrowly focused. 27 The literature 
discussing cases that address the role of social science under NEP A 
typically cites those cases to illustrate general legal issues, without 
treating the social science issues as salient in their own right. 28 
Meanwhile, legal commentators who are interested in social science 
tend to hold a constricted view of it-one that equates social science 
24 One commentator asserts that the "great increase in concern for policy implementation" 
constitutes the most significant development in policy analysis during the 1970s. DEAN E. 
MANN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 1 (1982). 
25 See generally RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CHANGE (1976); MANN, supra note 24; DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN & JEANNE NIENABER, 
CAN ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE? (1979); SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984). 
26 But see Judith A. Bradbury, The Use of Social Science Knowledge in Implementing the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh). 
',fl See generally Bill Shaw & Jim H. Robichaux, Council on Environmental Quality: 
Defining Human Environment, 16 CAL. W. L. REV. 201 (1980); Janet Boche, Note, Como-
Falcon v. Department of Labor: The Role of Public Hearings and Socio-Economic Impacts 
in Determining Whether NEPA Requires an EIS, 6 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 164 (1980); Joseph 
W. Cornelison, Comment, Socioeconomic Impacts and the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, 64 GEO. L.J. 1121 (1976). For an overview of the debate on using social science 
in risk assessment, see Deborah B. Bauser, Through the Looking Glass and Back Again: The 
Pane Case, A Rebuttal, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 211 (1985); William Freudenburg, Perceived 
Risk, Real Risk, 242 SCI. 44 (1988). 
A significant body of literature relating to Native American sacred lands provides a limited 
exception to the absence of social science perspectives in the NEPA scholarship. This litera-
ture, however, focuses on the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRF A) of 1978, 
codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988), rather than on the broader concerns that NEPA 
articulates. It warrants brief mention here because it falls within the larger category of 
articles regarding environmental review law. See, e.g., Suagee, supra note 14, at 49 n.242, 
51 n.250. 
28 For instance, Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980)-an 
important case involving a United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
plan for urban renewal in Manhattan-usually is cited to illustrate the United States Supreme 
Court's recent proceduralist interpretation of NEPA. See, e.g., Richard I. Goldsmith & 
William C. Banks, Environmental Values: Institutional Responsibility and the Supreme 
Court, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6-13 (1983). 
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with statistics-and to overlook NEP A's explicit requirements for 
the use of non-quantitative methods.29 Moreover, scholars in the field 
of law and society have elected not to consider the questions pre-
sented by the incorporation of social science into law as a component 
of environmental impact review. 30 
While the NEPA requirement that federal agencies evaluate the 
social impacts of a proposed agency action has not received the 
attention one might expect within the broader social science and 
legal communities, some scholars and practitioners involved in SIA 
have taken the time to assess the current state of the discipline. 
Their appraisals of SIA studies that agencies have produced in re-
sponse to NEP A's requirements are far from sanguine. An early 
inquiry into NEP A's social impact review requirements found that 
agencies' consideration of the social consequences of proposed proj-
ects in EISs was limited.31 Social impacts chapters in EISs were 
often dismal, consisting largely of economic justifications for the 
proposed projects and omitting any discussion of the projects' effects 
"on the human community as a system."32 For example, one EIS 
discussed a proposed agency action's impacts on Native American 
sacred lands under the heading "wilderness," not "culture" or "reli-
gion."33 The authors of this early inquiry concluded that "social im-
pact assessment in EIS's is almost always devoid of any recognizable 
social theory . . . . "34 
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (1988); see generally NOREEN L. CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE 
METHODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1985); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL 
SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1985); MICHAEL J. SAKS & CHARLES H. BARON, 
THE USE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF ApPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS (1980). 
One commentator criticizes courts that allow agencies to identify all socioeconomic impacts 
that cannot be measured as "insignificant," but this commentator goes on to accept the 
assumption that such non-quantifiable impacts therefore must be "speculative." Cornelison, 
supra note 27, at 1127-29. In fact, quantitative social science methodologies often rest on 
highly speCUlative maneuvers, whereas qualitative methodologies may be solidly empirical, 
involving little if any speculation. 
3/) These statements are based on the author's current understanding-he cannot claim 
expertise in each of the diverse fields discussed in this paragraph, and is willing to be proven 
wrong. The law and society literature may be found in LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, LAW & 
SOCIAL INQUIRY, and other journals. Work in social knowledge utilization and in law and 
society particularly have contributed to the perspectives developed below. Both of these areas 
are at the forefront in the exploration of the non-quantitative dimensions of social knowledge 
utilization. 
31 H. Paul Friesema & Paul J. Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the Environmental 
Impact Statement Process, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 339, 342 (1976). 
32 Id. at 343. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 345. 
1991] NEPA AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 39 
More recent assessments have been similarly bleak. A formal 
survey of EISs found that over four-fifths of the SIAs it sampled 
lacked any discernable social science method, technique, or theory. 35 
In addition, some scholars have identified what they term a "legal 
anomaly:"36 that EISs fail to take advantage of social science exper-
tise even though case law makes it clear that it is in everyone's best 
interests to describe social impacts fully in an EIS.37 Others, con-
cluding that the applied social research currently conducted for EISs 
is all too often nothing but "a shallow parody of contemporary social 
science,"38 have wondered why courts allow patently incompetent 
studies to pass as adequate analyses of social life in impacted com-
munities.39 More precisely, according to these commentators, courts 
have failed to hold agencies and their technical experts to standards 
that most scientists uphold. 40 
The consistently poor quality of SIA studies has raised not only 
eyebrows, but also the curiosity of social scientists. Social science 
responded to the requirements of environmental review statutes 
such as NEPA by trying to develop a sophisticated discipline tailored 
specifically to fulfilling the statutes' need for social impact analysis. 41 
The quality of most of the SIA studies that government agencies 
produce, however, still remains strikingly less than social science is 
capable of providing. What accounts for this phenomenon, which is 
so at odds with both common sense and legislative intent? One 
popular explanation is that efforts to introduce rationality into public 
decisionmaking always fail, because the public actions of agencies 
consist of political maneuvers rather than scientific management. 42 
35 Arthur S. Wilke & Harvey R. Cain, Social Impact Assessment Under NEPA: The State 
of the Field, 8 W. Soc. REV. 105, 107 (1977). 
36 William R. Freudenburg & Kenneth M. Keating, Applying Sociology to Policy: Social 
Science and the Environmental Impact Statement, 50 RURAL Soc. 578, 578 (1985). 
37 I d. at 581. 
38 Joseph G. Jorgensen, Anthropologists as Participants in the Policy Process, 1 POL'y 
STUD. REV. 66, 70 (1981). 
39 Id. at 71. 
40 Bert Black, Evolving Legal Standards for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 239 
SCI. 1508, 1510 (1988). 
41 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
42 Friesema & Culhane, supra note 31, at 340. According to many, this is exactly as it 
should be, because the alternative raises the anti-democratic spectre of rampant technocracy. 
See, e.g., Carol Weiss, Ideology, Interests, and Information: the Basis of Policy Positions, 
in ETHICS, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND POLICY ANALYSIS 213,221-23,241 (Daniel Callahan 
& Bruce Jennings eds., 1983). This concern, however, assumes positivist science. Adelaide H. 
Villmoare, Politics and Research: Epistemological Moments, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 149, 
152 (1990). As Villmoare notes, "post-modern" and interpretive models of science present 
more options. Id. 
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Indeed, expectations that NEP A will cause agencies to produce 
reasoned and coordinated policy is merely the latest variant of an 
ancient dream, the rational decisionmaking model of bureaucratic 
behavior, which has been long out of favor with political scientists. 43 
Although NEPA requires government agencies to prepare compe-
tent analyses,44 these agencies nonetheless retain great discretion in 
how they use such studies in their decisionmaking. 45 They can pro-
duce capable impact studies as required by statute and still respond 
to political realities. Thus, explanations for the failures of rational 
management in general may be less than enlightening when the issue 
is the narrower problem of producing competent social impact stud-
ies. 
Among explanations that focus more directly on the pathetic state 
of the SIA studies that agencies produce46 is the observation that a 
cogent analysis of social impacts would consider the political impli-
cations of a proposed action: how it might distribute positive and 
negative impacts differently to various classes or cultural groups. 47 
Such an analysis, however, would expose the government's "funda-
mental myth that [its] programs serve an undifferentiated public 
interest. "48 Other commentators take an opposite tack. They hold 
that SIA studies are of poor quality not because agencies are able 
to get away with willfully violating NEPA,49 but because special 
interest groups, using the EIS as an "instrument of legal and political 
warfare," make agencies the victims of "legal harassment."50 Such 
interference with agencies prevents them from functioning properly. 
Some critics view government agencies as "captured" by powerful 
business interests, or suggest that social scientists are the victims 
of subtle co-option by societal pressure or a professional socialization 
process that emphasizes "production science" more than "environ-
43 Friesema & Culhane, supra note 31, at 340. 
44 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1988); 40 C.F.R § 1500.1(b) (1990) ("The [EIS] information must 
be of high quality. Accurate scientific analysis ... [is] essential to implementing NEPA."); 
id. § 1502.24 ("Agencies shall insure the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, 
of the discussions and analyses in environmental impact statements."). 
45 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 217,223,256; Freudenburg & Keating, supra note 
36, at 581; Holland, supra note 20, at 759-67. 
46 Freudenburg & Keating, supra note 36, at 582-90; Friesema & Culhane, supra note 31, 
at 346-48; . 
47 Friesema & Culhane, supra note 31, at 348. 
48 Id. 
49 Freudenburg & Keating, supra note 36, at 591. 
50 Eugene Bardach & Lucian Pugliaresi, The Environmental-Impact Statement vs. the Real 
World, 49 PUB. INTEREST 22, 24 (1979). 
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mental/social impacts science. "51 Still others offer penetrating anal-
yses, not just of NEPA's social impacts review requirements, but of 
the whole NEPA process, finding that it results in mounds of useless 
paperwork, degrades science, and increases contention. 52 One study 
even argues that environmental politics generally represent nothing 
more than the internal socio-psychological dynamics of sectarian 
fringe groups. 53 In total, commentators have put forward an im-
pressive list of structural, political, and economic reasons bearing 
on the conundrum that agencies so regularly fail to produce good 
SIA studies, even though the law requires them to do so, and they 
may get sued if they do not. 
Many of these critiques are sound, noting the late and sometimes 
"after-the-fact" position of the NEPA EIS process in government 
agencies' overall decisionmaking processes, and the difficulties posed 
by NEP A's heavy reliance on judicial review for effect. Some ar-
guments, though, tend toward circularity. This may be seen, for 
instance, in the popular argument that NEPA must fail, because 
agencies inevitably are more committed to political maneuvering 
than wise or rational management of the public trust. The underlying 
structure of such arguments seems to be that agencies do not comply 
with NEP A because NEP A's mandates are unrealistic, and the fact 
that these mandates are unrealistic is evidenced by the agencies' 
noncompliance. 
Further, such arguments seem not to grasp the importance of 
mandating by statute the creation and use of social knowledge for 
agency decisionmaking. Legal mandates such as NEP A's social im-
pact review requirements exist for the express purpose of making 
otherwise unlikely things happen. Arguments that, for example, 
agencies prefer or are pressured into political maneuvering in their 
use of information might suffice to explain why SIA studies with a 
modicum of integrity and balance do not occur spontaneously. These 
arguments, however, may slip dangerously close to becoming facile 
post hoc rationalizations when offered as explanations for agency 
51 Freudenburg & Keating, supra note 36, at 594; see Allan Schnaiberg, Obstacles to 
Environmental Research by Scientists and Technologists: A Social Structural Analysis, 24 
Soc. PROBLEMS 500, 502 (1977); Errol Meidinger & Allan Schnaiberg, Social Impact Assess-
ment as Evaluation Research, 4 EVALUATION REV. 507, 515-16, 531 (1980); see generally 
ALLAN SCHNAIBERG, THE ENVIRONMENT: FROM SURPLUS To SCARCITY (1980). 
52 See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 25, at 161-63; Bardach & Pugliaresi, supra note 50, at 
24; see generally Fairfax, supra note 20; Sax, supra note 20. But see Caldwell, supra note 
20, at 25 (improvements in environmental science in recent years have allayed such early 
critiques of NEPA). 
53 MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982). 
42 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:31 
noncompliance with statutory law. Congress designed the procedural 
requirements of NEP A to force agencies to take "hard looks" at 
precisely those complex or uncomfortable issues that agencies tend 
to avoid. 54 At least some of the institutional problems with producing 
worthwhile SIA studies-problems of which NEPA's critics have 
made much-are of the kind that the United States, as a pragmatic 
nation, excels at surmounting. Given a clear legal mandate, why do 
not agencies and courts "just do it?" There are issues here that 
current structural and political analyses do not reach. It is the aim 
of this Article by supplementing such analyses, to move closer to 
answering this question. 
The social science community finds itself uncharacteristically in 
agreement on the fact that most EISs contain little or no social 
science. Even so, the EIS process is not entirely ineffective in chang-
ing agency sensibilities and behavior. On what is this efficacy based, 
if not on good faith assessment of social impacts? Analysts conclude 
that EISs are effective because they are part of a political, adver-
sarial process that opens agency decisionmaking to public scrutiny 
and judicial review. 55 
Within this political and legal context, however, the EIS process 
still turns on technical issues and scientific study. If the political 
nature of the EIS process dooms agency SIA studies to inadequacy, 
the effectiveness of this process then hinges on the public's com-
ments, which must present "technically sound, detailed, and clear" 
critiques of the draft EIS.56 Thus, we are left with the paradoxical 
conclusion that, while government agencies with the legal mandate 
and the resources to produce good social scientific analysis for EISs 
realistically cannot be expected to do so, the public, which lacks both 
mandate and resources, nevertheless must introduce sound social 
knowledge into the EIS process in the form of comments on the 
draft EIS. In this view, public comments are not responses to a 
sound technical analysis, as envisioned by NEPA's architects. 
Rather, they substitute for analysis in order to make the process 
work. 
Social science may play an adversarial or advocacy role in the 
NEPA process, supporting community values and concerns and 
countering the tendencies of agencies to produce EIS studies that 
54 Boggs, supra note 22, at 221; see also Holland, supra note 20, at 761 n.170 (review of 
"hard look" doctrine in NEPA case law). 
55 Friesema & Culhane, supra note 31, at 340, 354--56. 
66 Id. at 351. 
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either justify proposed projects or are simply inadequate. Requiring 
social science to play this role, however, entails certain risks when 
one side, the agency, has all the power and resources. 57 Even if 
shifting the burden for adequate SIAs onto often poor communities 
appears logical when one views NEP A implementation as a political 
process, this transfer of responsibility is not what NEP A intends 
and poses ethical and practical problems. 58 
General limitations on the judicial review of technical controver-
sies further complicate questions regarding the adequacy of SIA 
studies in EISs. Growing numbers of disputants are bringing con-
flicts that involve technical issues to court for resolution. Reasoning 
that government agencies have technical expertise that courts lack, 
as well as better knowledge of the social and economic contexts in 
which they administer particular statutes, courts often accord great 
deference to an agency interpretation of a statute for which the 
agency is responsible. 59 Courts also resolve cases on points of pro-
cedure, ignoring the substantive scientific questions raised. 60 Courts 
face a difficult dilemma in these cases, in that they must "evaluate 
expertise while simultaneously depending on it . . . . "61 
NEP A cases represent a significant subset of cases that involve 
technical knowledge. NEPA's requirement that agencies perform 
technical review is clear. The judiciary, however, is divided on 
whether to defer to the agencies' decisions in these cases or subject 
agency actions to more stringent substantive review on the strength 
of the substantive and procedural provisions of NEPA. 62 When issues 
involving the creation and application of social knowledge are at 
issue, judicial deference to an agency on the grounds of agency 
expertise may be especially misguided. Agencies often do not have 
social science expertise, even when they manage cultural resources 
or their decisions affect the social life of local communities, and 
environmental review statutes order them to review their actions 
with regard to these responsibilities. 
67 Freudenburg & Keating, supra note 36, at 599-600. 
58 See Sheila Jasanoff & Dorothy Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial 
Competence, 214 SCI. 1211, 1214-15 (1981). "Expert forums may limit the role of dissent by 
giving a dominant place to establishment views on controversial topics." Id. at 1215. 
59 William W. Ross, Components of an Adequate Record, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COL-
LABORATION 23, 26 (J.D. Nyhart and Milton M. Carrow eds., 1983). 
60 Edward L. Korwek, Science and the Courts, 210 SCI. 376, 376 (1980). 
61 Black, supra note 40, at 1508; see also Andrews, supra note 25, at 157-63; Hanna J. 
Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation: The National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 323, 329-37 (1976). 
62 Holland, supra note 20, at 766, 773. 
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In conclusion, existing analyses of the poverty of social science in 
EISs, while often cogent, remain incomplete. They rely basically on 
the insight that agencies, existing within a political environment, 
sometimes blatantly play politics with SIAs. Solutions, the reasoning 
goes, therefore also must lie in the political realm: either be "real-
istic" and recognize that the scientific quality of SIA studies is largely 
irrelevant in the political arena, or play politics as well and conduct 
advocacy social science for other adversaries in the process. All in 
all, these analyses neither grasp fully the reality of what happens 
when communities, agencies, social scientists, and lawyers enter the 
arena in a NEPA dispute, nor provide reasonable solutions to the 
very real problems they identify. 
C. Knowledge and Politics in the NEPA Process 
It is now well established that that NEPA broadens environmen-
talists' access to agency decisionmaking about federal projects that 
may have significant environmental effects.63 Similarly, NEPA pro-
vides a forum for Indian tribes and other economically and politically 
marginal communities that are concerned about a proposed project's 
social impacts. In effect, NEPA "applies a new force" to the basic 
principles of administrative law. 64 Expanding existing requirements 
for formal statements of findings, reasons, and disclosures, the stat-
ute subjects new categories of agency actions to review and tests 
ideas about fair informal procedure. 65 In other words, NEPA causes 
public decisionmaking to incorporate sources of knowledge that may 
exist somewhere in the general culture, but typically would not be 
part of the decisionmaking process. 
Focusing on the use of knowledge in the EIS process, rather than 
on the measurement of observable changes in agency behavior as a 
result of that process, fundamentally shifts our view of what imple-
menting NEPA means. As noted above, many commentators regard 
the statute's requirement of quality SIA studies as unrealistic and 
agree that the substance of such studies becomes irrelevant in the 
politically driven NEPA process. 66 Looking at NEPA as a political 
process whose success is quantifiable in terms of behavioral outcomes 
forces the quality and substance of SIA studies out of focus. They 
63 Cortner, supra note 61, at 329-32. 
54 [d. at 331 (quoting KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-PROB-
LEMS 587 (1973». 
66 [d. 
66 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
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become blurry background issues, dismissible as impractical expec-
tations. Understanding the implementation of NEPA as a problem 
of properly using knowledge, however, is like picking up a different 
lens. This new lens shifts the focus back to the issues of quality and 
substance and reduces the power of the purely political aspects of 
the NEP A process. It also moves the emphasis from behavior to 
cognition,67 and adds ethical considerations to purely pragmatic ones. 
It thus provides a sounder conceptual foundation for the role of SIA 
studies in the NEP A process. 
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE 
SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE DIMENSIONS OF NEPA IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Overview 
Existing approaches to understanding how social knowledge func-
tions in the NEP A process stress the political aspects of that process 
and proceed largely from narrow behaviorist premises. Social sci-
entists and legal scholars working in other fields, who might supple-
ment or even supplant these approaches, have not found their way 
to this important problem in the application of social science. This 
Article now explores some of the possibilities that lie in the resultant 
gaps in these potentially relevant fields. 68 It relies on studies in the 
fields of social knowledge utilization and law and society to develop 
an alternative approach to understanding the use of social knowledge 
under NEP A. It also draws insights from interpretive social science69 
to supplement current, behavioristic approaches to understanding 
the use of social science under NEP A. 
To reiterate briefly, environmental review statutes prescribe the 
systematic use of knowledge in agency decisionmaking. Because they 
require the use of social knowledge, in both qualitative and quanti-
67 See, e.g., William N. Dunn, Conceptualizing Knowledge Use, in KNowLEDGE GENER-
ATION, EXCHANGE, AND UTILIZATION 325,328-30,335-36 (George M. Beal et al. eds., 1986). 
68 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. 
69 See generally INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan 
eds., 1979) (overview of interpretive approaches). Commentators have noted that much of the 
commentary on the last two decades of anthropological thought "has tended to focus on the 
shift in stress from behavior and social structure, undergirded by the goal of 'a natural science 
of society,' ... to a renewed recognition ... that social life must fundamentally be conceived 
as the negotiation of meanings." GEORGE E. MARCUS & MICHAEL M.J. FISCHER, ANTHRO-
POLOGY AS CULTURAL CRITIQUE: AN EXPERIMENTAL MOMENT IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 26 
(1986). "Culture, after all, is a continuous creative, inventive process ... not a dead repre-
sentation." Malcom R. Crick, Anthropology of Knowledge, 11 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 
287, 299 (1982). 
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tative forms, implementing these statutes means using "social knowl-
edge. "70 Our inquiry builds on a developing theoretical approach that 
regards human society and culture as consisting of not only static 
structure and impersonal evolutionary process, but also creative 
individual and collective activity.71 Social life is not simply form and 
process-it is also production.72 Within this theoretical framework, 
law becomes an institution by which people actively create and ex-
press their sociocultural reality, rather than a passive reflection of 
society's consensus about norms. 73 
One consequence of adopting this framework is the recognition 
that the diverse "conditions of existence" in modern society generate 
a great multiplicity of "forms of knowledge"74 within the differing 
institutions and classes that make up society.75 In other words, there 
are likely to be profound differences in value and perspective among 
individuals who inhabit the same physical space and identify as 
members of the same community: who pass each other on the side-
walk, talk together in the same office, or live in the same house. 76 
This point is more than an abstraction or academic invention. To 
regard knowledge about society as a product of social activity is to 
direct attention to the ways in which the forms of social knowledge 
we create and legitimate profoundly mold the social orders within 
which we live and the ways in which we relate to tradition, create 
70 The use of social knowledge is cognitive as well as instrumental; it results in changes in 
understanding as much as in behavior. Further, social knowledge use is as much a social and 
cultural phenomenon as an individual or psychological one. See infra notes 74-76 and accom-
panying text. This formulation brings recent developments from the fields of anthropology, 
ethics, and social knowledge utilization to bear on problems arising in the implementation of 
environmental review law and sets that inquiry on a broad foundation of contemporary 
scholarship in the social sciences and humanities. 
71 See, e.g., MARCUS & FISCHER, supra note 69, at 26; Crick, supra note 69, at 299. 
72 See, e.g., MARCUS & FISCHER, supra note 69, at 26; Crick, supra note 69, at 299. 
73 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE 167, 216-19 (1983). 
74 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
75 PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 78 (1977); see G. Carter Bentley, 
Ethnicity and Practice, 29 COMPo STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 24, 27-29 (1987). 
76 See Geertz, supra note 73, at 155. Geertz notes "how deeply into our lives the specificities 
of our vocations penetrate, how little those vocations are simply a trade we ply and how much 
a world we inhabit .... " [d. Adopting such a perspective can lead to extreme expressions of 
philosophical anti-realism. Interpretive social science does raise fundamental questions about 
the very nature of scientific knowledge, just as it raises basic questions about the role of 
science in society. Such issues lie beyond the scope of this Article, but bear on the arguments 
it develops. For a reasoned discussion of the realism issue, see Austin Sarat, Off to Meet the 
Wizard: Beyond Validity and Reliability in the Search for a Post-Empiricist Sociology of 
Law, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 155 (1990). 
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and respond to change, confront differences, and live our daily 
lives. 77 
Because different members of a given social order interpret avail-
able knowledge in different and often conflicting ways, we cannot 
assume a common and "objective" social reality apart from the 
knowledge forms by which we understand that reality. What we try 
to describe objectively is itself grounded in interpretations. It is this 
lack of an ultimately objective social reality that makes understand-
ing social knowledge and its uses an interpretive task. 78 
As noted above, the administration oflaw is one mode of producing 
and using social knowledge, a social act that is intimately related to 
the creation and maintenance of society itself.79 Much of the daily 
reproduction of this public expression of social order takes place 
within definable contexts, or "policy domains." 
B. Defining Policy Domains 
Two parameters define a policy domain: a policy focus, and knowl-
edge about the object of that focus. 8o The domain of United States 
Indian policy focuses on Native American persons, cultures, and 
lands, and on relevant federal and state laws and treaties. 81 All of 
these factors delineate the borders of an arena in which various 
legislative and administrative institutions operate. Some of these 
institutions, such as the BIA, are dedicated to this arena, while most 
enter it only occasionally.82 In sum, the arena and the institutions 
77 Geertz, supra note 73, at 153. According to Geertz, "to analyze symbol use as social 
action ... [is to regard] the community as the shop in which thoughts are constructed and 
deconstructed, history the terrain they seize and surrender, and [is] to attend therefore to 
such muscular matters as the representation of authority, the marking of boundaries, the 
rhetoric of persuasion, the expression of commitment, and the registering of dissent." Id. 
78 See, e.g., William N. Dunn, Studying Knowledge Use: A Profile of Procedures and 
Issues, in KNOWLEDGE GENERATION, EXCHANGE, AND UTILIZATION, supra note 67, at 369, 
389-90. 
79 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
80 See MacRae, Building Policy-Related Technical Communities, 8 KNOWLEDGE 431, 441 
(1987); see also ERVE CHAMBERS, ApPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 45-46 
(1985); MARC L. MILLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS 3--32 (1987); Hjern & Porter, Implementation Structures: A New Unit of Admin-
istrative Analysis, in REALIZING SOCIAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE 265, 265 (Holzner et al. eds., 
1983); see generally ORAN R. YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES: NATURAL RESOURCES AND 
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1982). 
81 E.g., American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988). 
82 For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency administers federal 
environmental laws that contain provisions affecting Native American tribes. See, e.g., Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9626 
(1988). 
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operating in it constitute the structural framework of the Indian 
policy domain. 
Decisionmakers in the arena of United States Indian policy act on 
the basis of their knowledge about the subject matter that is the 
substance of the arena: Native American peoples and cultures and 
their status within the wider society.83 Not all available knowledge, 
however, becomes the basis for agency action. There are many stud-
ies and much data in archives and universities that are ignored, and 
many possible approaches to research that are not adopted. The 
knowledge that eventually forms the foundation for an agency de-
cision, and the principles by which agency decisionmakers select that 
knowledge from the larger pool of relevant knowledge, constitute 
the second parameter defining policy domains. The Indian policy 
domain here denotes both that arena of policy action dealing with 
Native American issues and the body of social knowledge upon which 
agency decisionmakers rely in taking action within that arena. 
Understanding the concept of policy domains sets. the stage for 
looking anew at the implementation of environmental review stat-
utes. Such statutes, like NEPA, formally mandate the use of tech-
nical and scientific knowledge, including the results of social science 
research. 84 The Indian policy domain, however, is a formidable in-
stitution that has stood for years on its own foundation of social 
knowledge. NEPA's mandate for the use of social knowledge here 
will introduce different and sometimes clashing forms of social knowl-
edge into an already established policy domain. The subsequent 
dynamics constitute a critical dimension of implementing environ-
mental review law when Native American issues are involved. 
Comprehending the overall framework of a policy domain requires 
one to take at least three lines of inquiry. One line of inquiry involves 
looking at actual decisions within a policy arena and piecing together 
the premises that seem to inform them. For instance, one might 
examine the rhetoric justifying the actions in question, consider their 
likely or documented results, inquire of those who formulate and 
implement them what their expectations and concerns are, and re-
view relevant scholarly analyses. 85 A second line of inquiry involves 
83 Crick, supra note 69, at 293 ("[O]f necessity the knowledge we formulate about 'the 
other' is bound to be refracted through the knowledge we have built to define ourselves."). 
The knowledge that informs United States policies regarding Native Americans consists not 
only of knowledge about Native Americans, but also of knowledge about non-Native Americans 
in relation to Native Americans. See id. 
B4 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1988). 
85 For discussions of relevant methodological issues, see Bradbury, supra note 26, at 43-
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examining the historical dimensions of a policy domain. The very 
concept of "domain" implies boundaries and identity and hence his-
torical continuity.86 Thus, it should be possible to link present actions 
and the rationales underlying them to past policies. Current policy 
is better understood when placed in historical context. Through 
these first two steps, case study and historical review, the basic 
outlines of the dominant conceptual framework will begin to emerge. 
The third area of inquiry consists of identifying the processes that 
protect the boundaries of the policy domain under examination: in 
other words, those means by which the integrity of the dominant 
conceptual framework that underlies decision and action within a 
policy arena is maintained. How, exactly, is potentially relevant 
knowledge "selected into" or "selected out of" a policy domain? Why 
does relevant information either become that knowledge on the basis 
of which action is taken or remain invisible, insignificant, or repug-
nant in the eyes of agency decisionmakers? These simple questions 
hold the keys to understanding how policy domains function and 
persist. 
Commentators have identified a number of mechanisms by which 
agency decisionmakers select certain pieces of social knowledge to 
become the basis for policy action. First, natural resource manage-
ment and environmental protection have been the subjects of highly 
polarized discussions for years, and participants in the agency deci-
sionmaking process tend to fall into camps according to this polar-
ity.87 "Knowledge disavowal"88 and "biased assimilation"89 are two 
basic means by which some agency decisionmakers ignore "uncom-
fortable knowledge" or alter it to protect existing policies. 90 In other 
81; Walter Williams, The Study of Implementation: An Overview, in STUDYING IMPLEMEN-
TATION 1-17 (Walter Williams ed., 1982); see generally William N. Dunn, Reforms as Argu-
ments, 3 KNOWLEDGE 293 (1982); Dunn, supra note 67; Dunn, supra note 78. 
86 Interview with Nancy Leifer, Independent Consultant and Editor, in Missoula, Mont. 
(Jan. 19, 1990). 
f!7 See Carol H. Weiss, Perspectives on Knowledge Use in National Policy Making, in 
KNOWLEDGE GENERATION, EXCHANGE, AND UTILIZATION, supra note 67, at 407, 411. Ac-
cording to Weiss, "[o]ften the constellation of interests around a policy issue predetermines 
the positions that decision makers take, or debate has gone on over a period of years and 
opinions have hardened .... For reasons of interest, ideology, or intellect, [policy makers 
take] a stand that research is not likely to shake." Id. . 
88 See Gerald Zaltman, Knowledge Utilization as Planned Social Change, in KNOWLEDGE 
GENERATION, EXCHANGE, AND UTILIZATION, supra note 67, at 433,455. 
89 Charles G. Lord et ai., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of 
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 
2098, 2098-99 (1979). 
90 Elizabeth Colson, Using Anthropology in a World on the Move, 44 HUM. ORGANIZATION 
191, 195 (1985). 
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words, officials sometimes overlook information when they do not 
want to confront its implications, or reinterpret it to conform to their 
own expectations. "N ondecision" plays a similar role. 91 Agency de-
cisionmakers who "nondecide" define available knowledge as not 
presenting options or requiring decision. "N ondecision" has been 
evident in many NEP A disputes where agency officials have viewed 
EISs as procedural documents whose findings require no substantive 
action on their part. 92 
In an excellent account of his experiences with the EIS process, 
one observer commented on a particular agency's apparent inability 
to deal with the public input that NEPA had required it to request. 93 
The agency "simply did not know what to do with this qualitative 
data, however empirically sound," and rejected "most of it as too 
subjective to be used in its planning and decisionmaking. "94 The 
efforts of local residents to participate therefore dwindled in the face 
of the agency's "unwavering ability to take their views out of ac-
count. "95 Defining the knowledge with which it was presented as 
"too subjective," the agency disavowed the content of the informa-
tion by slighting its form. 96 
In some cases, there simply may be a lack of awareness, even at 
the highest levels, that an agency action involves decision at all. 
Rather than requiring a decision, agency officials may see the need 
simply for a "correction" to "keep things on course."97 Moreover, in 
structured adversarial systems, knowledge loses value as fact, be-
cause players in those systems regard it as a tool or weapon for their 
side.98 Intelligence agencies, for example, value information not so 
91 Weiss, supra note 87, at 421-22. As Weiss explains, "many issues never come up for 
decision because dominant values or organizational procedures keep them off the agenda . . . 
'Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.' ... [C]ommunity 
values, myths, precedents, rituals, and institutional procedures determine what is-and what 
is not-to be decided." Id. 
92 See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
93 See RAYMOND L. GOLD, RANCHING, MINING, AND THE HUMAN IMPACT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 45-46 (1985). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 46. 
96 See id. 
97 Id. at 45; see Weiss, supra note 87, at 422 ("The actors do not define the issue as a 
decision situation but as a temporary inconvenience ... [or they] base decisions on implicit 
rules."). 
98 See, e.g., James G. March, Theories of Choice and Making Decisions, 21 SOC'y 29, 33 
(1982). March observes that, in the "conflict systems" organizing much bureaucratic behavior, 
"information is an instrument of strategic actors ... [and has] considerably less value than it 
might be expected to have if strategic considerations were not so pervasive." Id. Legal systems 
develop norms and rituals to guard against these tendencies for knowledge distortion in 
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much for its truth as for its potential to advance their cause, and 
they do not hesitate to conceal or selectively distort it for this 
purpose. 99 This tendency is apparent in adversarial bureaucratic and 
legal systems. 100 
The very modes of inquiry that government agencies use limit the 
range of questions that they can ask and the kinds of knowledge 
that they are able to develop. In general, Western applied science 
has been oriented toward the production of particular resources and 
the control of narrowly defined problems, rather than toward com-
prehension of the ecological and social effects that have followed 
from its efforts. 101 The resulting gaps in data and method are difficult 
to fill. "Historical non-issueness" tends to become current and future 
"non-issueness."102 In other words, agencies approach problems in a 
piecemeal fashion because they lack the perspective and knowledge 
to do otherwise. They take a positivist approach to applying social 
knowledge-separating "fact" and "value"-that makes it possible 
to introduce new knowledge as "data" while keeping the boundaries 
of their particular policy domain intact.103 They preserve these 
boundaries against NEPA-based challenges by interpreting NEPA 
in strictly procedural terms. 104 
Moreover, in contrast to the world of scholarship, where conflicting 
paradigms may coexist in productive disharmony, the knowledge 
bases of policy domains tend more strongly toward consistency and 
are more resistant to change. 105 Agencies create overarching con-
ceptual frameworks in which to make their decisions, and these 
frameworks almost inevitably become less flexible as time passes. 
Unable to maintain the type of internal disagreement that gives rise 
to constructive debate over policy direction and formulation, an 
agency begins to focus on developing loyalty and weeding out incor-
rigible dissidents. When presented with new mandates, the agency 
implements them slowly and incrementally or resists altogether. It 
adversarial contexts, as illustrated by the dramatic ritual of the witness swearing "to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See Schnaiberg, supra note 51, at 331-32. 
102 See id. 
103 See Dunn, supra note 85, at 300-02. 
104 Caldwell, supra note 20, at 7, 10. 
lOS See Guy B. Adams, The Sensus Communis: A Framework for Valuative Discourse on 
Public Policy, in POLICY ANALYSIS: PERSPECTIVES, CONCEPTS, AND METHODS 169, 172 
(William N. Dunn ed., 1986) (discussing "crushing concreteness ... [in] tradition" in public 
policy). 
/ 
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exercises these mechanisms for maintaining policy domain bound-
aries in an effort to maintain its stability and identity. 
In practice, the three lines of inquiry explored here are less dis-
tinct than presented, and the investigation is iterative rather than 
linear. In addition, an effective investigation may depend as much 
on the investigator having developed a "feel" for the policy domain 
in question as on the application of formal methodologies. 106 
c. Knowledge and Power in the Domain of u.s. Indian Policy 
Every policy domain develops its own distinctive and somewhat 
stable knowledge base. Because these knowledge bases serve as the 
foundations for government agency decisions, each policy domain is 
in fact a means by which social reality is constructed. Decisions 
originating within the federal Indian policy domain have a notably 
self-fulfilling quality. lO7 They are premised on forms of social knowl-
edge that, for example, cast Native American cultures as anomalous 
relics or as harmful to the interests of those who participate in 
them.108 As a result, they help construct social realities that accord 
with these premises. To state this significant point differently, highly 
invasive activities such as mining, road building, timber cutting, and 
dam construction on Native American lands greatly affect Native 
American cultures. They contribute to the decline of these cultures, 
making them less distinct and harming their members through in-
creased alcoholism, violence, suicide, and other concomitants of cul-
tural disruption. Thus, agency decisions to allow such activities cre-
ate the very social realities that agency decisionmakers misguidedly 
assume already exist. When such forms of social knowledge become 
the basis for agency decisions, they have the effect of retrofitting 
future reality to initially false premises. 
106 See, e.g., Robert K. Yin, Studying the Implementation of Public Programs, in STUDY-
ING IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 85, at 36. 
107 Cf Robert K. Merton, The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 8 ANTIOCH REV. 193 (1948). 
108 Notions about the inferiority of Native American culture and its detrimental influences 
on Native American persons underlie many aspects of federal Indian policy. Federal policies 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were directed toward "blotting out" 
the "barbarous dialects" of Native American tribes and "gradually obliterating" their distinct 
customs and differences. FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS 21-22 
(1976). Few questioned that this effort was in the Indians' best interests. See id. Another 
commentator, identifying the "stigma of inferiority" inflicted upon Native Americans in the 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court, explored "the Court's transformation of prej-
udice into legal principle." Irene K. Harvey, Note, Constitutional Law: Congressional Plenary 
Power Over Indian Affairs-A Doctrine Rooted in Prejudice, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 117, 
120 (1982). 
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As a result, parties that dispute the forms of social knowledge 
used in agency decisionmaking are involved in "negotiating the very 
meaning of society. "109 If, in the world of scholarship, social reality 
becomes translated into social knowledge, then in the world of policy, 
the relationship often is reversed, and social knowledge-whether 
initially based on verifiable fact or not-often becomes social reality. 
D. The Introduction of Clashing Perspectives into the Indian 
Policy Domain 
NEPA, as an environmental review law, challenges the founda-
tions of existing federal Indian policy by mandating the introduction 
of new types of knowledge into the agency decisionmaking process. 
First, NEP A's requirement that agencies use social science metho-
dologies in the preparation of SIA studies under NEP A 110 introduces 
perspectives from the social sciences directly into the public debates 
surrounding the controversial projects that trigger the EIS process. 
Second, the statute's provisions for the incorporation of both SIA 
studies and public input into EISs invite the perspectives of affected 
communities and peoples into those debates. III 
Native American perspectives do not collide with the assimilation-
ist premises of federal Indian policy so much as they inhabit an 
altogether different realm of discourse. It is easy for a tribal elder 
and an agency administrator to talk past one another, because from 
a Native American perspective, the well-being of tribal cultures and 
traditions is integrally related to the well-being of Indian persons. 
The aims and concerns of social scientists often parallel the aims and 
concerns of Native Americans and clash with those of the decision-
makers who formulate federal Indian policy. The mandated entry of 
professional social science into the public decisionmaking process-
like the introduction of Native American perspectives into that proc-
ess-may lead to different political, legal, and moral outcomes. It 
also may result in a different understanding of what are legitimate 
questions and relevant answers.112 Part IV of this Article will show 
how federal Indian policy may be understood as a policy domain 
whose dominant theme has been and continues to be assimilation. 113 
109 See generally MARCUS & FISCHER, supra note 69. 
llO See supra notes 7, 22 and accompanying text. 
III See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2 (1990). 
ll2 See infra notes 194-203. 
ll3 See Sharon O'Brien, Cultural Rights in the United States: A Conflict of Values, 5 LAW 
& INEQUALITY 267, 268-69 (1987) (asserting that assimilationist premises undergird minority 
relations in United States). 
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IV. THE DOMAIN OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY: 
ASSIMILATION AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 
Why does so much complex and well-meaning knowledge about 
society turn into increasingly trivial and meaningless politics?114 
The domain of United States Indian policy rests on a well-defined 
body of law,115 social knowledge, and historical precedent. In the 
past, Native American religions, languages, customs, and traditions 
were the objects of active repression. Native Americans were pun-
ished if they held ceremonies, children in school were whipped if 
they spoke their native tongues, and statutes such as the General 
Allotment Act of 1887116 were enacted to help break down commu-
nally oriented tribal social structures and force Native Americans 
into the dominant social and economic systems. 117 Those in authority 
often presented these measures, intended to hasten the assumed 
inevitable assimilation of Native Americans into the dominant cul-
ture, as humanitarian rather than oppressive. 118 
The focus of official federal Indian policy has tended to shift rad-
ically every few decades. 119 Commentators typically characterize the 
present period as one of Native American "self-determination,"12o 
following the assimilationist "Termination Era" of the 1950s and 
114 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Room to Manoeuver: Paradox, Program, or Pandora's 
Box?, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 149, 162 (1989). 
115 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-2721 (1988) (codifying federal "Indian law"). 
116 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1988); see generally D.S. OTIS, 
THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (1973), Known as the Dawes Act, 
the General Allotment Act of 1887 broke up tribally held reservation lands into individual 
"allotments" and reverted many remaining lands back to the public domain for sale to non-
Native Americans. Senator Dawes indicated the clear assimilationist purpose of the act that 
was named after him when he said, "[t]he philosophy of the present policy is to treat [the 
Indian] as an individual, and not as an insoluble substance that the civilization of this country 
has been unable, hitherto, to digest .... The last and the best agency of civilization is to 
teach a grown-up Indian to keep [material possessions]." [d. at 249-50. Theodore Roosevelt 
heralded the Dawes Act as a "pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass." O'Brien, supra 
note 113, at 294. 
117 See Arrell M. Gibson, Philosophical, Legal, and Social Rationales for Appropriating 
the Tribal Estate, 1607 to 1980, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 3, 4 (1984) ("From their ideological 
viewpoint, the intruders could legitimately dispossess the Indian of his land because they 
were exercising their duty as Christians to enlighten the 'savage."'). 
118 See id. 
119 See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 13 (1987). 
120 See, e.g., MONROE E. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 86-90 (1973); Mark 
Allen, Native American Control of Tribal Natural Resource Development in the Context of 
The Federal Trust and Tribal Self-Determination, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 857, 857 
n.3 (1989) ("Today ... the official federal policy supports tribal self-determination. "). 
1991] NEPA AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 55 
1960s. 121 It is one thing, however, to proclaim a new policy; imple-
menting that policy through the innumerable and dispersed actions 
of governance is, as they say, a horse of a different color.l22 At their 
core, such policy shifts represent not just simple changes in the 
behavior of governmental agencies, but the establishment of new 
forms of knowledge, new ways of seeing the world, within an existing 
policy domain. 123 In this light, it seems that the knowledge base of 
federal Indian policy has changed little over the centuries, and that 
assimilationist premises still underlie many of the decisions that the 
various branches of the federal government make. 124 
What, then, is the social knowledge upon which federal Indian 
policy is founded? This question opens the door to an interpretive 
analysis of the knowledge base that supports the Indian policy do-
main. It is possible to "reason back" from the government's manifest 
policies to the forms of knowledge that logically would support them. 
One then may compare these interpretations to historical sources, 
contemporary social and legal scholarship, and current rhetoric and 
policy. 
Both overt and covert policies for cultural assimilation typically 
recognize individual "culture carriers" as persons, but neither un-
derstand nor value their culture. 125 Federal Indian policy has rested 
121 PRICE, supra note 120, at 83-86. 
122 See Allen, supra note 120, at 886. It is common for a central authority to espouse a new 
theory or policy, making it doctrine, while allowing dispersed or lower-echelon bodies to 
continue to act in accustomed grooves. See id. Similarly, Congress may enact laws to imple-
ment Native American self-determination only to have the administration in power undercut 
these laws by acting on the basis of assimilationist paradigms. See id. at 895. 
123 That policy implementation often requires the introduction of new forms of knowledge 
into the policy process as the basis for action is both the point of this paper and the reason 
that the NEPA "experiment," with its substantive articulation of a new environmental policy 
and its detailed procedural mandates, is important. 
124 See infra notes 130-48 and accompanying text. There is some evidence that these self-
determination policies are beginning to take effect; however, there are the dangers of confusing 
the expression of policy for reality and failing to appreciate how remarkably ingrained are the 
methods by which we discount other cultures and peoples. See O'Brien, supra note 113, at 
354-58. It remains simple to find examples of "subtle but powerful attempt[s] by the federal 
government to assimilate the tribes into mainstream society, a position contrary to the stated 
federal policy supporting tribal self-determination." Allen, supra note 120, at 886-87. 
125 See Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL 
SCIENCE, supra note 69, at 25, 67-68. Taylor intimates at what is involved in understanding 
other cultures: "It may not just be that to understand a certain explanation [of other cultural 
ways] one has to sharpen one's intuitions; it may be that one has to change one's orientation-
if not in adopting another orientation, at least in living one's own in a way which allows for 
greater comprehension of others." I d. 
The inability of Euro-American society to nurture this quality of understanding for Native 
American cultures lies behind the most basic issues of Indian law. The legal system that 
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on notions that Native American cultures impede the progress of 
Native American people, that these cultures are disappearing any-
way, that Native American religious beliefs are not sincere or are 
wrong or even heathen, and so on. 126 Underlying these notions are 
beliefs in the virtues of American individualism and of respect, at 
least in principle, for the person, coupled with an inability to appre-
ciate Native cultures on their own terms. 127 These converge in the 
unquestioned premise that Native American persons and their cul-
tures are separate entities. One can find innumerable expressions of 
this view. Richard Henry Pratt's rhetoric is typical: "[A] great gen-
eral has said that the only good Indian is a dead one . . . . I agree 
with the sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian there is in 
the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him and save the man. "128 
The social knowledge base of federal Indian policy still rests 
largely, as in the past, on simplistic versions of the liberal Western 
belief in a radical separation between person and culture. On one 
hand, this belief serves as the foundation for efforts to debunk 
scientific racism and further social melioration. 129 If all humans are 
inherently equal and differ only in cultures and circumstances that 
can be changed, then racist policies become less tenable, ~nd social 
improvement is possible. On the other hand, in the context of federal 
Indian policy in particular, this belief has taken the form of an 
implicit assumption that Native Americans can, with benefit to them-
selves, be forced through punishment, hunger, and other means to 
give up their traditional ways. A contemporary expression of this 
assumption is the view that, if circumstances force Native Americans 
to abandon their communities in order to find work in the dominant 
society, they should do so and adapt "like everyone else." Related 
views monolithically define United States culture as a "melting pot" 
or as inherently superior to Native American cultures. l30 
European settlers brought to the Americas was not adequate to "define that portion of 
sovereignty retained by Native tribes. Contradiction and confusion concerning Indian law was 
the inevitable result." Steven B. Anderson, Research Project, Native American Indian Law 
and the Burger Court: A Shift in Judicial Methods, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 671, 671-72 (1985); 
see also Wilkinson, supra note 119, at 3. 
126 See infra note 131 and accompanying text. Until recently, Native Americans "were 
commonly regarded as savages who had no religion. Medicine men . . . were regarded as 
sorcerers, conjurers, and quacks." Suagee, supra note 14, at 7-8. 
127 See Anderson, supra note 125, at 671-72. 
128 DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78 
(1979) (quoting AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIAN 260-61 (Francis P. Prucha ed., 1973». 
Pratt became head of the influential Carlisle Indian School in 1879 and gained prominence as 
a reformer of Indian policy and as an educator. PRUCHA, supra note 108, at 172-84. 
129 O'Brien, supra note 113, at 272. 
130 Harvey, supra note 108, at 120; O'Brien, supra note 113, at 268. 
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Much of contemporary federal Indian policy may be understood as 
a direct extension of older government programs aimed at forcing 
assimilation. Today, the goal of assimilation finds expression less in 
outright oppression than in a studied indifference to Native Ameri-
can concerns in the administration of government programs. 131 An 
illustrative example is the refusal or inability of one Department of 
Interior agency after another to consider the sociocultura1 conse-
quences of various coal leasing programs in southeastern Montana. 132 
With the institutions of the dominant society firmly in place on and 
surrounding reservations, overt oppression has become less neces-
sary to bring Native American resources under non-Native Ameri-
can economic control. What might pass for indifference in this cir-
cumstance may indeed be active oppression. 133 
In considering the implementation of environmental review law in 
the Indian policy domain, it is helpful not only to depict the knowl-
edge base of federal Indian policy, but also to gather insights into 
the dynamics that define and maintain that body of ideas and impres-
sions. While assimilation has governed federal Indian policy, com-
peting paradigms were, and are, always available. In 1880, for in-
stance, public rhetoric in favor of assimilation approached its peak, 
and Congress enacted the General Allotment Act,l34 the single most 
significant piece of assimilationist legislation. A minority report of 
the House Committee on Indian Affairs, however, attacked the al-
lotment plan, arguing that dividing tribally held land into small, 
individual parcels would not turn Native Americans into farmers. 135 
131 Howard Stambor, Manifest Destiny and American Indian Religious Freedom: Se-
quoyah, Badoni, and the Drowned Gods, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 59, 61 (1982) ("[I]gnorance 
and inadvertence have come to replace the avarice and malice that formerly inspired govern-
ment attitudes toward the American Indian. "). 
132 See infra notes 176-205 and accompanying text. 
133 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, WORKS AND LIVES: THE ANTHROPOLOGIST AS AUTHOR 134 (1988) 
(quoting JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: How ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OB-
JECT 149 (1983». "A persistent myth ... has been that of a single decisive conquista, 
occupation, or establishment of colonial power, a myth which has its complement in similar 
notions of sudden decolonization and accession to independence. Both have worked against 
giving proper theoretical importance to overwhelming evidence for repeated acts of oppression, 
campaigns of pacification and suppression of rebellions, no matter whether these were carried 
out by military means, by religious and educational indoctrination, by administrative mea-
sures, or, as is more common now, by intricate monetary and economic manipulation . ... " 
Id. (emphasis added). 
One commentator has noted that an important breakthrough in the ability of disciplines 
such as anthropology and history to examine their own biases was their "recogniz[ing] the 
mythical elements in colonial perceptions and the active bearing of this mythology on the 
subjugation and destruction of native people." William S. Simmons, Culture Theory in Con-
temporary Ethnohistory, 35 ETHNOHISTORY 1, 5 (1988). 
134 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
135 PRUCHA, supra note 108, at 245-46. 
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According to the report, the Native American's "whole tradition and 
culture predisposed him against the 'scheme for his improvement, 
devised by those who judge[d] him exclusively from their standpoint 
instead of from his."'136 The momentum in favor of allotment never-
theless proved overwhelming, and the assimilationist paradigm pre-
vailed. 
How is knowledge such as that contained in the minority report 
"organized out" of the decisionmaking process?137 The answer is that 
the mechanisms designed to protect the boundaries of policy domains 
visibly are working. One easily can discern how the social knowledge 
that traditionally has defined the federal Indian policy domain has 
shaped even the most general contours of decisions affecting Native 
Americans. For example, the judiciary has been ambivalent in de-
veloping legal principles that could protect tribes as corporate 
entitiesl38 and virtually silent in developing principles that would go 
further and protect tribal culture and tradition. 139 Courts have 
chosen not to see the detrimental impacts that the "atrophy of tribal 
life and its traditional economy and culture"14o have on Native Amer-
icans as the grounds for extending the federal trust responsibility 
into even such simple areas as the provision of needed services to 
tribes,141 much less as a basis for protecting traditional tribal culture. 
Similarly, the stated purpose of the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act (AIRF A) of 1978142 is to protect Native religions against 
egregious interference by federal authorities. The judiciary, how-
ever, provides little support for Native American interests when 
federal agencies, pursuing other interests, ignore AIRFA because 
it is more convenient to them to do so. Congress framed AIRF A to 
136 Id. 
137 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
138 See Wilkinson, supra note 119, at 56. This remains true today. The Burger Court, for 
example, balanced Native American sovereignty as only one of many variables that "the Court 
[would] weigh when faced with the multiple interests present within cases involving . . . 
[Native American tribal jurisdiction]." Anderson, supra note 125, at 672. Although an under-
lying purpose of the federal trust responsibility is to protect tribal self-government, not one 
court has stated that federal agencies can be enjoined from an action interfering with tribal 
autonomy. Reid P. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to 
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1242-43 (1975). 
139 Courts often have articulated their prejudices toward Native American culture. Harvey, 
supra note 108, at 138. Harvey attributes the development of the doctrine of federal plenary 
power over Native American affairs to such negative perceptions. Id. at 118-19, 138-48. 
140 Chambers, supra note 138, at 1244. 
141 Id. at 1243-45. 
142 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988). 
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allow administrative balancing of competing interests. 143 The result 
is an act that is virtually without "teeth" in the courts. 144 
This discussion must close with two caveats. First, while the 
boundaries of the established Indian policy domain seem impenetra-
ble, like all social phenomena, they are inherently flexible. If humans 
are aptly characterized as "self-defining beings, "145 then fundamental 
changes can be effected in federal Indian policy. Second, although 
the body of social knowledge underlying the Indian policy domain 
has remained fairly consistent, federal Indian policy as implemented 
has not merely fluctuated, but been notoriously inconsistent. 146 
Nonetheless, when one focuses on the beliefs underlying federal 
Indian policy, its wild swings seem less severe and more like varia-
tions on a theme. For example, most scholars regard the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 as inaugurating a distinctly new 
policy-promoting the reconstitution of tribal governments-in re-
action to the excesses of the allotment period. 147 One may argue, 
however, that the IRA merely signalled a shift from the individualist 
mode of assimilation that drove allotment to a corporatist mode that 
accorded with the emergence of the corporation in everyday life. 
The IRA undoubtedly was a reaction to the devastation of allotment. 
Nevertheless, it reflected assimilation in a different guise rather 
than a new-found respect for Native American culture. 148 The com-
143 Ellen M.W. Sewell, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 
429, 468 (1983). 
144 Suagee, supra note 14, at 2--3. Suagee pointed out that, "[i]n all of the cases in which 
Indians have sought access to and protection of religious properties located on public lands, 
and federal land managers have declined to accommodate the Indian concerns, the Indians 
have not been successful in obtaining the relief they have sought from the courts, with the 
exception of one very recent case .... " Id. The United States Supreme Court, however, 
reversed this "exception" in 1988. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n, 
485 U.S. 439 (1988) (see discussion infra notes 156-75 and accompanying text). As a result, 
AIRFA has failed altogether to protect Native American sacred sites or worship on public 
lands. 
145 Taylor, supra note 125, at 67. 
146 For differing perspectives on the historical shifts in federal Indian policy, see FELIX S. 
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47-206 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982); 
PRICE, supra note 120, at 68-92; Robert S. Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 
62 OR. L. REV. 29, 31 (1983); see generally Wilkinson, supra note 119. 
147 See Cohen, supra note 146, at 144-45. The IRA embodied "an emerging historical and 
anthropological respect for the tribes, in contrast to the previous desire to see Native Amer-
icans wholly assimilated into mainstream America." Allen, supra note 120, at 862. 
148 Kenneth R. Peres, The Political Economy of Federal Indian Policy 283-87 (1989) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, New School for Social Research, Graduate Faculty). The IRA 
became "a form of assimilation, because tribal custom was not the basis of the written [tribal] 
constitutions." Allen, supra note 120, at 863. 
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monly accepted portrait of federal Indian policy as comprising mark-
edly distinct eras, while not inaccurate, may overlook the extent to 
which the theme of assimilation consistently has dominated the ap-
proach of the government to Native Americans. 
V. THE CLASH OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE PERSPECTIVES UNDER 
NEPA 
A. NEPA's Mandates Within the Conceptual Framework o/the 
Indian Policy Domain 
Statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions have determined that 
NEPA applies to Native Americans and their reservations. 149 A 
federal agency implements NEPA within the context of the Indian 
policy domain when the agency undertakes an SIA study, holds a 
public hearing, or otherwise solicits social science knowledge for use 
in the evaluation of a proposed administrative action, and the study, 
hearing, or action involves Native Americans. These occasions set 
in motion the conflicting forces of federal Indian policy and environ-
mental review law. 
On one hand, the images and symbols on which the knowledge 
base of the Indian policy domain is predicated tend subtly, or not so 
subtly, to define the conceptual framework within which government 
decisionmakers try to implement NEPA's vague mandates for the 
use of social knowledge. The triumvirate of individualism, work, and 
money as "American" values, the notion of Native American cultures 
as primitive, and the continued existence of racial stereotypes swing 
into action when the decisionmaking process begins. On the other 
hand, NEP A's procedural requirements for study, analysis, and pub-
lic participation introduce a range of differing perspectives directly 
into the decisionmaking process and define them as relevant to the 
issues at hand. 150 These requirements work to neutralize the mech-
anisms that preserve the boundaries of the Indian policy domain. 
This oppositional dynamic is visible in public policy disputes that 
invoke NEPA and involve Indian tribes. 
149 See, e.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593,598 (10th Cir. 1972) (NEPA applies to Indian 
reservations). Most, if not all, of the federal agency regulations implementing environmental 
review law refer specifically to "Indians." See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508 (1990) (CEQ 
regulations implementing NEPA). 
150 Through environmental review laws, "professionals of the disciplines of cultural re-
sources management have institutionalized access to influence federal agency decision making. " 
Suagee, supra note 14, at 17. Without such statutes, "there might be very little communication 
between the inhabitants of these two worlds-federal officials and traditional Indians." [d. 
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B. Medicine Wheel and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass'n: Illustrations of the Oppositional Dynamic 
Between Federal Indian Policy and NEPA 
61 
The Medicine Wheel, a prehistoric stone structure in the Big Horn 
Mountains of northern Wyoming, is a sacred site for several Native 
American tribes whose religious practitioners regularly worship 
there. 151 Nonetheless, before late 1989, the United States Forest 
Service (USFS) had managed the site as if it had no contemporary 
religious value. Until recently, a sign on the nearby highway pro-
claimed that the Medicine Wheel was "an historic Indian relic;"152 
now a new sign calls the site "an historic landmark." In 1989, the 
USFS began to pursue plans to log in the immediate vicinity of the 
site, in the areas that Native Americans use for worship and privacy, 
and to develop the site itself as a tourist attraction with a parking 
lot, a large visitor center, and a boardwalk overlooking the Medicine 
Wheel. 153 Tribal representatives experienced great difficulty in get-
ting the USFS to heed NEP A's impact review provisions, let alone 
recognize the tribes' concerns about the potentially devastating ef-
fects of the proposed activities. l54 For example, at one meeting, an 
exasperated USFS official reportedly told tribal elders that "there 
are no spirits there .... [The Medicine Wheel is] just a pile of 
rock."155 
151 The Medicine Wheel, where Native Americans from the Great Basin and Northern 
Plains have worshipped for generations, is regarded as the "altar" of the sacred Medicine 
Mountain. Interview with William Tall Bull, Chairman of the Northern Cheyenne Cultural 
Committee of the Northern Cheyenne tribe, in Billings, Mont. (Nov. 17, 1989). 
152 Id. 
153 Henry F. Smeal, The Battle of the Big Horn Medicine Wheel: Religious Freedom, Self-
Determination, and Political Power Among the Plains Indians 3-4 (1989) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the Department of Anthropology, Columbia University). 
164 Interview with William Tall Bull, Chairman of the Northern Cheyenne Cultural Com-
mittee of the Northern Cheyenne tribe, in Billings, Mont. (Nov. 17, 1989). The USFS recently 
responded to tribal requests, and to the growing controversy surrounding its management of 
the Medicine Wheel site, by preparing a draft EIS. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MEDICINE WHEEL 
NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARK DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1991). At 
this writing, the official comment period is still open. The author knows, however, that many 
inhabitants of the affected reservations feel that the draft EIS does not address their concerns, 
in part because it fails to incorporate the alternative management plan that certain of these 
inhabitants had proposed. 
In addition, the "preparers" of the EIS do not include any Native American cultural experts, 
ethnographers, or cultural anthropologists who could address Native American concerns. 
Although the issues involved in managing the Medicine Wheel as a Native American sacred 
site are social and cultural, the EIS preparers all have degrees in natural science or natural 
resource management, with the exception of two "archaeologists," who do not possess graduate 
degrees and have the least work experience of any of those involved. Id. 
155 Interview with Nicol Price, Coordinator of the Medicine Wheel Alliance (May 22, 1990); 
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Some of the tribes' difficulties in the Medicine Wheel case likely 
were exacerbated by a 1988 Supreme Court opinion, Lyng v. N orth-
west Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n. 156 In Northwest Indian 
Cemetery, several California tribes brought suit against the USFS 
in order to enjoin agency plans to develop roads and log in their 
sacred areas. 157 The United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California and then the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the tribes had a right under the 
First Amendment to religious freedom,158 but the USFS appealed 
to the Supreme Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a ma-
jority opinion that reversed the lower courts and allowed the USFS 
to proceed with its plans. 159 At this writing, however, the USFS has 
not yet commenced the proposed road building or logging. 
A great deal more could be said about Northwest Indian Cemetery. 
Here, however, the essential point is that the Court chose not to 
recognize the cultural distinctiveness of either the tribes or their 
religion. Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the respondents' be-
liefs were "sincere," and that the USFS's plans to build roads and 
log in the areas they use for exercising their religious beliefs would 
have significantly detrimental impacts on their practice of their re-
ligion. 16o Despite this finding, however, the Court still found that the 
proposed agency action in question would not "penalize religious 
activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, 
and privileges enjoyed by other citizens."161 
How could a governmental action devastate a people's religious 
practice and not deprive those people of the right to religious free-
dom "enjoyed by other citizens?" The United States Constitution, 
after all, will continue to protect these "other citizens" in the practice 
of their religions. The Court glossed over this inconsistency by con-
struing the Native American practices in question as individual pref-
Smeal, supra note 153, at 10. The USFS seems to have changed its position since this Article 
first was written in the fall of 1989, but the major issues remain unresolved at this writing. 
156 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
157 Id. at 443. 
158 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that the 
proposed USFS actions would "burden the free exercise of plaintiffs' religion." Northwest 
Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 595 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld this judgment. 795 F.2d 688, 
688-89, 691-93 (9th Cir. 1986). 
169 Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. at 442. 
160 See id. at 447. The Court also stated that "[t]he government does not dispute, and we 
have no reason to doubt, that the logging and road-building projects at issue in the case could 
have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices." Id. at 450. 
161 Id. at 449. 
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erences rather than as the foundation for the cultural identities of 
the tribes. 162 Referring to the respondents' use of the sacred "High 
Country" that the USFS plans to log, the Court noted that individ-
uals primarily used the area for their own "personal spiritual devel-
opment" in the belief that their activities advanced "the welfare of 
the tribe, and indeed, of mankind itself. "163 There is no indication 
that the Court understood the tribes' religion as the property of a 
distinct society and culture. Rather, in the Court's view, what was 
threatened were merely the religious practices of particular individ-
uals. As individuals, Native Americans may believe that their prac-
tices are important for their tribe and for "mankind itself." This 
reference to tribe and "mankind" merely secures the idiosyncratic 
nature of Native American beliefs in the Court's construction, how-
ever, because few in the dominant society would concede that vision 
quests by members of little-known tribes in an obscure corner of a 
national forest are essential to the advancement of humanity. 
In stating the issue in these terms-as a matter of "private per-
sons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own 
religious beliefs"I64-the Court employed "knowledge disavowal" and 
"non-decision"165 to deflect all questions regarding the cultural 
uniqueness of Native American religion. Only by cleaving to such 
radical "culture blindness,"166 a blindness consonant with the knowl-
edge base of the Indian policy domain, can the Court maintain that 
government actions that might destroy Native American religions 
nonetheless will not deny any individual "an equal share of the rights, 
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens."167 Of course gov-
ernment plans to log Native sacred areas do not deny Native Amer-
icans, as individual citizens, the right to practice the same religions 
as "other citizens," but such a conclusion constitutes an outrageous 
dismissal of Native American cultural differences. The Court de-
162 See id. at 452. The Court constructed the issue as one of individual rights by selecting 
as its governing precedent, from among earlier First Amendment cases, a holding that the 
Free Exercise Clause does not "require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in 
ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens .... 'The Free Exercise 
Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it 
does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal 
procedures.'" Id. at 448 (emphases added) (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986)). 
163 Id. at 451. 
164 I d. at 449. 
165 See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
166 Ernest Gellner, The Stakes in Anthropology, 57 AM. SCHOLAR 17, 23 (1988). "America 
is inclined to culture-blindness because, on the whole, it takes its own luminously individualist 
culture for granted, and sees it as manifestly obvious." Id. 
167 Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. at 449. 
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cided, however, that government would not be able to function at 
all, let alone effectively, if it had to fulfill the religious needs of every 
citizen. 168 According to the Court, the First Amendment "must apply 
to all citizens alike . . . . "169 In such statements, we see how the 
assimilationist canon, its harsh articulation from the turn of the 
century only slightly softened, underlies the Court's rationale in this 
case. 170 
Conversely, the strongly worded dissent illustrates how NEP A, 
as an environmental review law, sets in motion an opposing force 
within the Indian policy domain.171 While the knowledge base that 
underpins federal Indian policy informs agencies' implementation of 
NEPA in that domain, NEPA simultaneously requires the use of 
criteria different from those that define the domain's boundaries. 
The dissent, in marked contrast to the majority opinion, implicitly 
acknowledges this dynamic. It draws from an anthropological report, 
commissioned by the USFS under NEPA and AIRF A mandates, 172 
not just the fact that USFS plans likely would devastate a people's 
religion, but also the understanding that Native American culture 
differs significantly from the dominant culture. 173 The dissent draws 
on this recognition in concluding that such cultural differences must 
be recognized as legally relevant to the definition of religious 
rights. 174 
168 Id. at 452. 
169 Id.; cf. Sewell, supra note 143, at 441 ("Whenever universalistic egalitarian principles 
are applied to Indians in the guise of extending individual rights, there is the danger that 
valuable tribal rights will be taken away, and nothing given in return."). Commentators have 
noted tensions between American individualism and cultural rights in other contexts as well. 
See, e.g., Carol J. Greenhouse, Anthropology at Home: Whose Home? 44 HUM. ORGANIZATION 
261, 263-64 (1985). One commentator explained that individualism "does not lend itself readily 
to diversity .... It is a cultural logic that generates outsiders, since anyone who is perceived 
to be 'different' jeopardizes the social order by challenging its limits .... [It is this] equation 
of culturality and citizenship ... that makes pluralism so conceptually difficult." Id. 
170 See Stephen L. Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections 
on Recent Cases, 9 N. Ky. L. REV. 265, 280-81 (1982) ("Freedom of religion lies at the core 
of the fundamental problem of encompassing substantially different cultures within one polit-
ical entity. It is thus a constitutional problem in the deepest sense, not only a problem of 
interpreting a particular phrase in a particular document, but a problem of constituting a 
functional polity from disparate and divergent groups and cultures."). 
171 Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. at 458-77. 
172 Id. at 459. 
173 I d. at 460. At first, the dissent identified the issue as one of a threat to a religion, not 
simply to the preferences of individual citizens. Id. at 458. It proceeded to discuss unique 
aspects of Indian religions and cultures, considerations to which the majority opinion gave 
minimal attention. Id. at 460-62. 
174 Id. at 460. The dissent asserted that, "[w]here dogma lies at the heart of western 
religions, Native American faith is inextricably bound to the use of land." Id. at 460-61. This 
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If one follows the dissent's nonassimilationist approach and views 
cultural differences as relevant to public decisionmaking, then the 
Court's reasoning in Northwest Indian Cemetery only can appear 
baffling or absurd. The dissent expresses this sense of anomaly when 
it notes "the cruelly surreal result" of the majority opinion: an agency 
action that basically will "destroy a religion is nevertheless deemed 
not to 'burden' that religion."175 Thus, while environmental review 
law requirements in the Indian policy domain must filter through 
the assimilationist approach that is the domain's conceptual frame-
work, they also act powerfully to introduce clashing paradigms into 
public debate. Northwest Indian Cemetery demonstrates how 
NEPA's mandate for social impact review introduces new perspec-
tives into the federal Indian policy domain and legitimates them in 
that context, even when they do not prevail. Implementing NEP A 
in the Indian policy domain ultimately makes explicit both the clash 
of cultures within that domain and the contrasting values existing 
within the dominant culture. 
C. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel: Another Illustration 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the BIA, an agency within the United 
States Department of the Interior (DOl), initiated a leasing program 
that eventually committed over fifty percent of the Northern Chey-
enne reservation in rural southeastern Montana to mining and coal-
fired power plant construction.176 Neither the BIA nor any other 
agency, however, considered the potential sociocultural impacts of 
the lease sales on the Northern Cheyenne tribe or informed the 
tribe's members of the likelihood of such impacts, even though the 
later lease deals occurred after the enactment of NEPA in 1969. The 
tribe passed a resolution in 1973 asking the Secretary of the Interior 
to withdraw approval of the leases. The attorney for the tribe found 
what he later described as "a staggering array of law violations" 
associated with the lease program. 177 The DOl suspended the leases 
case thus "represents yet another stress point in the longstanding conflict between two 
disparate cultures .... " [d. at 473. 
175 [d. at 472 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Sewell avers that the results of previous cases 
protecting either individuals against government action that violated their religious beliefs or 
religious practices deemed central to an institutionalized religion become "absurd as applied 
to Indians, especially those who have long lived or worshipped in territory now managed by 
the federal government .... " Sewell, supra note 143, at 456; see also Pepper, supra note 
170, at 283 n.89. 
176 Steven Chestnut, Coal Development on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, in U.S. 
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 159 (1978). 
177 [d. at 166. 
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in 1974,178 and in 1980, Congress enacted special legislation to cancel 
them. 179 
In the late 1970s, hard on the heels of the lease cancellations, the 
United States Geological Survey (USGS)-also a DOl agency-and 
the state of Montana jointly prepared a regional EIS for a planned 
Northern Plains coal leasing program. 180 The areas proposed for 
leasing surrounded the Northern Cheyenne reservation and were 
near the Crow reservation, but did not include Indian-owned coaL 
Moreover, the EIS study area did not include the affected reserva-
tions, leaving a conspicuous blank space in the middle of the study 
area map. 181 Although impacts from industrial projects in rural areas 
do not stop at political boundaries, the USGS and the state of Mon-
tana did no more than vaguely acknowledge the potential social 
impacts of the proposed leasing program on the reservations. 182 A 
lawsuit alleging that the lack of tribal involvement in the EIS process 
resulted in an inadequate analysis of the program's implications 
seemed imminent, but the government agencies abandoned the pro-
gram. 183 
In 1982, the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
initiated the Northern Powder River Round I coal leasing program, 
which repeated all the same, now familiar, legal mistakes. l84 This 
program was, at the time, the largest proposed sale of federal coal 
178 The Secretary of the Interior announced his decision to suspend the Northern Cheyenne 
coal leases on June 4, 1974, noting that "the tribe's petition presents extraordinary circum-
stances." Id. at 174 app. B. In suspending the leases, the Secretary cited his recognition of 
his trust responsibility to the tribe, and the seriousness of the alleged law violations. Id. at 
172-75. 
179 Act of October 9, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-401, 94 Stat. 1701 (1980). 
180 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY & MONT. DEP'T OF STATE LANDS, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT: NORTHERN POWDER RIVER BASIN COAL, MONTANA (1979). 
181 Id. at inside front cover. 
182 The Summary of the Draft EIS (DSEIS) makes no mention of the substantial and 
significant Native American populations in the study area. Id. at iii-v. An "Attachment" to 
the Summary does not list either the Northern Cheyenne or the Crow tribes among the 
agencies or organizations that were invited to comment on the DSEIS. Id. at vii-viii. One 
cannot identify sections dealing with Native Americans by looking at the Table of Contents. 
Id. at ix-xiv. The DSEIS claims to consider "any impact the proposed developments would 
have on the reservations." Id. at pt. I, at 1. In fact, while the DSEIS refers to Native 
American populations, it provides no impact analyses regarding the tribes. See, e.g., id. at 
pt. II, at 20, 110-11; id. at pt. IV, at 46, 69; id. at pt. VIII, at 13. 
183 Note here, in light of the history just recounted, the remarkable perseverance of domain 
boundaries and especially of their underlying knowledge paradigms. Cf. supra note 105 and 
accompanying text. 
184 Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 842 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir.), rrwdijied, 851 F.2d 
1152 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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in the nation's history.185 The planned lease tracts surround the 
Northern Cheyenne reservation on three sides, with all of the tracts 
lying within sixteen miles of the reservation border. 186 Modern coal 
development of this magnitude constitutes a massive industrial in-
trusion into such an agriculturally based society. Still, the leasing 
tract profiles were prepared, the final tracts selected, and a final 
EIS written, all with barely a mention of the Northern Cheyenne 
tribe or its reservation. 187 The Northern Cheyennes brought suit in 
1982,188 alleging violations of NEPA and the federal government's 
trust responsibility.189 The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Montana found that the BLM had failed to consider impacts 
to the Northern Cheyenne tribe in its leasing program and therefore 
had violated NEP A, the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act 
(FCLAA) of 1976,190 DOl regulations promulgated pursuant to 
FCLAA,191 and the government's trust responsibility to the N orth-
ern Cheyenne tribe. 192 
Just as in Northwest Indian Cemetery, the NEPA review process 
broke down at the point where the statute required the collection 
and use of sociocultural information in the formulation of an agency 
decision. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel illustrates how the dy-
namics of domain boundary maintenance often play themselves out 
in debates over methodological issues such as what questions it is 
legitimate to ask, which data are relevant, and so on. In other words, 
the case shows how fundamental conflicts between different sets of 
values are played out as procedural or technical arguments. 193 
In Northern Cheyenne Tribe, the BLM argued that, rather than 
ignoring the tribe in drafting the required EIS, agency researchers 
185 Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training 
Program) 3065, 3065 (May 28, 1985). 
186 Id. 
187 Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 842 F.2d at 226. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. For an assessment of the significance of Northern Cheyenne Tribe in the context of 
federal trust responsibility, see Adele Fine, Off-Reservation Enforcement of the Federal-
Indian Trust Responsibility, 7 PUB. LAND L. REV. 117, 129-33 (1986). 
190 Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 83 (codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.). 
191 Department of the Interior Regulations Pertaining to Coal Management, Federally 
Owned Coal, 43 C.F.R. § 3400 (1981). 
192 Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training 
Program) 3065, 3075 (May 28, 1985). 
193 "Questions of aesthetics, of human dignity, and of religious belief underlie many allegedly 
scientific disputes." Jasanoff and Nelldn, supra note 58, at 1214. However, "proposals that 
seek to develop factual justification for ethical decisions often represent an extension of 
scientific rationality to inappropriate areas." I d. 
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had chosen to "deal with the Indians simply as people affected by 
the sale and their reservation as any other real estate in the sale 
area."I94 This is classic assimilationist doctrine, identical to that ex-
plicitly governing federal Indian policy a century ago195 and advanced 
here for tactical purposes as a professional research strategy. Pre-
sented as a question of methodology, the decision to "whitewash" 
the Northern Cheyennes was in fact a transparent policy choice, by 
BLM administrators, that reflected the distorted knowledge base 
governing the Indian policy domain. Relying on the assumption that 
distinctive Native American culture either does not exist or is irrel-
evant, the agency laid the groundwork for a decision that would 
"retrofit" social reality to meet its assumption. l96 Its decision to 
permit massive industrial development in a rural area without regard 
for the impacts on the Native American communities in that area 
was a decision to erode the uniqueness of these communities and 
their ability to survive, and to bring reality closer to the mistaken 
premises underlying the decision. 
The court, however, rejected the BLM's argument and held that 
the Northern Cheyenne tribe was "culturally distinct. "197 Thus, ac-
cording to the court, the BLM's supposition that it could treat the 
tribe in an SIA study merely as another group of citizens whom the 
proposed leasing program might affect was "faulty. "198 In making 
the empirical finding that the Northern Cheyennes' culture is differ-
ent from the dominant culture, the court signaled the type of social 
knowledge it found legally relevant in the particular policy context. 
The court's decision did not answer an empirical question, because 
the cultural distinctiveness of the Northern Cheyenne tribe was not 
truly at issue. The fact that a definable Northern Cheyenne cultural 
identity exists has been documented for more than a century.l99 The 
BLM could not argue that the tribe lacks a unique culture, because 
194 Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 
3068. 
195 See, e.g., GETCHES ET AL., supra note 128, at 69-79; see also supra notes 114-48 and 
accompanying text. 
196 See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
197 Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 
3068. 
198 Id. 
199 See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY, 
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941); PETER J. POWELL, SWEET 
MEDICINE (1969); JOHN STANDS IN TIMBER & MARGOT LIBERTY, CHEYENNE MEMORIES 
(1967). 
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such an argument would not have been credible. Rather, the agency 
simply regarded this fact as irrelevant to its EIS and hence to its 
decisionmaking process. 2oo The issue was not whether the fact of a 
distinct Northern Cheyenne culture was valid or verifiable, but 
whether the mass of documented knowledge supporting this fact fell 
within the established Indian policy domain: whether such knowl-
edge bore on the policy decisions at hand.201 In essence, the issue 
was one of the inclusion or exclusion of potentially relevant knowl-
edge. In Northern Cheyenne Tribe, then, when the court asserted 
the facti city of Northern Cheyenne cultural identity, it signalled its 
intention to regard this identity as legally salient. 
Having defined the range of relevant discourse to include a rec-
ognition of Northern Cheyenne culture, the court concluded that 
DOl "obvious[ly]" had to consider the impacts, including the social 
and economic impacts, of its proposed coal development on the 
Northern Cheyenne tribe. 202 According to the court, merely con-
sulting a map and noting the proximity of the proposed lease tracts 
to the reservation logically led to this conclusion. 203 
At least at the district court level, Northern Cheyenne Tribe 
illustrates how a legal decision that sets a new frame of reference in 
place in a policy domain can moot problems such as an alleged lack 
of relevant data and the unwillingness of agencies to consider how 
their actions might affect disparate groups. In response to the dis-
trict court's ruling, the BLM prepared a supplemental EIS for the 
leasing program.204 While it was by no means perfect, this supple-
mental EIS used credible original research and responded to the 
200 The court underscored that the substantive intent behind the EIS requirement was not 
simply research for its own sake, but rather the gathering of information for decisionmaking. 
See Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 
3074. 
201 Cf. Santos, supra note 114, at 162-63 ("[T]he gigantic body of knowledge accumulated 
by the social sciences has shown a total incapacity to change the existing mystifying common 
sense .•.. "). 
202 Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 
3068. 
203 ld. For more on Northern Cheyenne Tribe, see Boggs, SIA in Legal Theory and Practice: 
The Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 Soc. IMPACT ASSESSMENT 3 (1988); Fine, supra 
note 189, at 129--32; Freudenburg, supra note 22, at 455; Freudenburg & Keating, supra note 
36, at 592. 
204 Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 842 F.2d 224, 226-27 (9th Cir.), modified, 851 F.2d 
1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988); U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DRAFT ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL SUPPLEMENT: POWDER RIVER I REGIONAL EIS (1989). The Final Supple-
mental EIS was issued in June 1990. 
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concerns of the Northern Cheyenne and Crow tribes. For example, 
the BLM sponsored an ethnographic study to evaluate the impacts 
of the program on the tribes' cultural and religious activities. 
Although Northern Cheyenne Tribe is still in the courts, the 
Northern Cheyenne tribe's successes to date show that effective 
implementation of NEPA's social impact review requirements is 
achievable, even in the midst of adversarial circumstances that are 
further fueled by cultural differences. 205 Again, the question is not 
simply government agencies' compliance with NEP A's procedural 
requirements in making obscure administrative decisions. The con-
flict is over the forms of social knowledge on which these agencies 
will base their policy actions and thus over the construction of social 
reality itself. 
In Northwest Indian Cemetery, an anthropological report that the 
USFS had commissioned early in the planning process demonstrated 
both the cultural distinctiveness of the religious practices threatened 
by the logging that the USFS had proposed, and the deep signifi-
cance of those practices to the tribes that believed in them. 206 The 
lower court decisions and the dissenting Supreme Court opinion 
illustrate how the NEP A mandates for social impact review made 
the knowledge contained in this report legally relevant, even though 
the base of social knowledge that traditionally has governed federal 
Indian policy still controlled the Court's framing and disposition of 
the case. Similarly, Northern Cheyenne Tribe demonstrates both the 
staying power of the social knowledge that underlies the Indian 
policy domain and the confrontational dynamic that environmental 
review law's introduction of new forms of social knowledge into that 
domain creates. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
NEP A, as an "environmental overlay on the statutory responsi-
bilities of all federal agencies,"207 introduces into the domain of fed-
205 Two of the companies that purchased leases for new mines just east of the reservation 
have asked DOl to cancel their leases. Noting that the supplemental EIS "found serious 
impacts to the tribe," the companies fear mitigation requirements and continuing litigation. 
See Thackeray, BILLINGS GAZETTE, June 11, 1991, at 1, col. 3. Most recently, the United 
States District Court for the District of Montana concluded that, "as a matter of fundamental 
fairness," the companies should not have to pay for the Secretary of the Interior's "own lack 
of diligence in shaping the proper remedy for his previous mistakes," and has granted the 
companies' request. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Lujan, No. CV 82-116-BLG-J"FB, slip op. 
at 23 (D. Mont. July 24, 1991). 
206 See supra notes 156-75 and accompanying text. 
207 MANDELKER, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
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eral Indian policy forms of social knowledge that directly clash with 
the beliefs that have governed institutionalized federal Indian policy 
for centuries. In NEP A cases that concern Native American inter-
ests, the underlying disputes are about broad, conflicting paradigms 
that the parties rarely make explicit. These paradigms remain 
cloaked in narrow facts and legal technicalities. They nonetheless 
constitute a real dimension in the agency decisionmaking process. 
NEP A's mandate for large-scale use of social science tends to force 
these underlying paradigms nearer the surface. In NEP A cases, it 
becomes clear that recent developments within the social sciences 
may compete not only with older concepts and among themselves in 
the pages of scholarly journals, but also in legislative halls and 
courtrooms as tools for setting public policy. Needed are methods 
not only for making these developments more openly a part of the 
public debate, but also for applying them more systematically in the 
various contexts that compose the public sphere. 208 
Because NEP A expressly requires the use of social knowledge, 
disputes over the EIS process most fundamentally become arenas 
for the negotiation of meanings: meanings that simultaneously derive 
from and structure social relations and the quality of peoples' lives. 
In this light, the issues of quality, substance, and focus in SIA studies 
are hardly irrelevant to the political nature of the EIS process-
mere epiphenomena over which the hard realities of power relations, 
proceduralist interpretations, and legal and administrative techni-
calities rule. If anything, the opposite is true: political jockeying 
revolves around the substantive issues that are embedded in differ-
ing knowledge paradigms, and the real question is which knowledge 
will be legitimated as relevant to policy. Only after answering that 
question do agency decisionmakers engage the more familiar ques-
tion of which forms of knowledge, so legitimized, will govern deci-
sions. 
If the ability to define the meanings by which people live consti-
tutes power,209 then efforts to keep conflicting forms of knowledge 
208 Frederic G. Reamer, Principles of Ethics and the Justification of Policy, in POLICY 
ANALYSIS: PERSPECTIVES, CONCEPTS AND METHODS, supra note 105, at 223, 236. ("When 
we construct public policy, we are engaged in far more than mere cognitive gymnastics; we 
are inventing frameworks that will affect people's lives, we hope for the better. Philosophical 
discourse tends to push us to think through in a disciplined way the ideas we are about to 
unleash upon the world, and it is important to identify and examine critically our differences 
of opinion. "). 
209 John P. Esser & David M. Trubek, From "Scientism Without Determinism" to "Inter-
pretation Without Politics", 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 171, 175 (1990). 
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out of policy discourse makes good sense to those in power. Forth-
right exercises of agency power, countermoves in response to 
NEP A's introduction of uncomfortable knowledge into agency deci-
sionmaking, undoubtedly account for the seemingly anomalous ab-
sence of social science or Native American perspectives in many SIA 
studies. It is not inevitable, however, that social science in the 
agency decisionmaking process must be the victim of politics. Nor 
is the production of high-quality SIA studies an unrealistic goal. 
Rather, it is a practical, achievable, and pragmatically significant 
one.210 Indeed, the interplay of forces in NEP A cases illustrates the 
critically important role of social science in helping articulate "a 
richer 'philosophical anthropology' as the theoretical groundwork for 
a shared public philosophy:"211 an emerging and truly democratic 
public philosophy to be shared widely in a culturally diverse world. 
210 The Berger inquiry in Canada constitutes perhaps the most notable example of Native 
American perspectives being introduced into policy discourse by environmental review law 
processes. THOMAS BERGER, NORTHERN FRONTIER, NORTHERN HOMELAND: REPORT OF THE 
MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE INQUIRY (1977); see also D.J. Gamble, The Berger Inquiry: 
An Impact Assessment Process, 199 SCI. 946-51 (1978); Charles F. Wilkinson, Book Review, 
29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1097-99 (1989) (reviewing CAROLYN SWAYZE, HARD CHOICES, THE 
LIFE OF TOM BERGER (1987»; see generally Joseph G. Jorgensen et al., Social Indicators in 
Native Village Alaska, 44 HUM. ORGANIZATION 2 (1985); Richard W. Stoffle & Michael J. 
Evans, Holistic Conservation and Cultural Triage: American Indian Perspectives on Cul-
tural Resources, 49 HUM. ORGANIZATION 91 (1990). 
211 Bruce Jennings & Kenneth Prewitt, The Humanities and the Social Sciences, Recon-
structing a Public Philosophy, in ApPLYING THE HUMANITIES 125, 127 (Daniel Callahan et 
al. eds., 1985). 
